The main topics to be considered under the heading of Stoic ethics are: I. responsibility (eph hemin [up to us]), II. duty (deon [binding], prepon [fitting, viz. for the agent], kathekon [suited to the situation]),1 and III. well-being or happiness (eudaimonia; the Stoics preferred the word eurhoia: flowing well, unobstructed flow). Put otherwise, they are: the conditions under which praise or blame is deserved; the considerations that determine what one ought to do in various circumstances; and contentment or satisfaction.
In a memorable phrase Epictetus said, “Some things are up to us (eph hemin); others are not,” a maxim already established by the work of Chrysippus as cardinal to Stoic doctrine in general (Encheiridion, 1).2 Epictetus, along with the other Stoics, held that distinction to be fundamental in the conduct of life; living wisely requires constant attention to it, and fixing responsibility depends upon it. Since the Stoics held that everything that happens, including everything that any person does, is caused by antecedent conditions according to immutable laws, they maintained that responsibility for one's behavior in general or for a particular action or failure to perform does not require that there be no causes or explanations for it (whatever that might mean). Responsibility depends on what causes the behavior. Chrysippus made this point by his use of two common Greek terms: heimarmene and anangke (misleadingly translated most often as “fate” and “necessity” respectively). In Chrysippus’ usage heimarmene is the network of causes which explains everything that happens. Anangke, on the other hand, is restricted to what is external to an agent and constrains his or its behavior (the cognate verb anangkazo means “compel” or “force”). What is “up to us” is what is not compelled, and it is the requirement for moral responsibility, not the absence of any causes. Briefly and crudely put, if, no matter how hard a person tried or would have tried, he could not have performed some feat, then he is not to blame for his failure to perform it. If, on the other hand, he had the resources, and the circumstances permitted the performance, and it was something he should have done, then he is to blame for his failure. It was “up to him.”
Cultural determinants of behavior patterns were obviously not allowed as universally excusing conditions, though they were admitted as explanatory. However, the Stoic position is unlike politically conservative modern views of responsibility, because Stoics were not enthusiastic about reprimanding or punishing those who have been found responsible. Generally, their attitude was forward-looking, in favor of learning from past experience and of reform. On the other hand, they did not endorse the maxim that “to know all is to forgive all.” They maintained, instead, that how one should treat a culprit (including oneself) depends on a variety of circumstances and conditions, as is always the case when determining how one ought to behave. Perhaps, when there is opportunity, one should reason with him.
1
The distinction made here between prepon and kathekon is not made explicit in the Stoic writings, but is warranted by their use of these terms in context.
2
This distinction is fluid because the acquisition of knowledge, skill, and self-control is a gradual process, making possible at one time what was not previously possible; see footnote 3 on the next page.
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